Introduction
Since Gill and Kharas (2007) introduced the term 'middle-income trap' in the lexicon, the number of papers mentioning this supposedly observable phenomenon, as well as indirect references to it, has increased significantly. In many developing economies, policy discussions center on it and governments even speak of drawing plans to avoid it.
The problem is that despite the numerous references to it, the idea of a middle-income trap is rather vague, not to mention that the term is not part of development-growth literature. The idea derives from the observation that some of economies that crossed the middle-income threshold have not achieved high-income status yet; while some others have done it. The former economies have been referred to as being stuck in the 'middle-income trap.' Economies like Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil, or the Philippines have been said to be in the trap. And many others, including the People's Republic of China (PRC), have been warned that they might fall into it soon. One way to see graphically what those who refer to this phenomenon could possibly mean is shown in Figure 1 , which plots in the horizontal axis the number of years elapsed since economies reached $3000 (measured in 2005 purchasing power parity [PPP] $), against income per capita in the vertical axis. While the Republic of Korea has progressed significantly, the other economies in Figure 1 seem to be 'stuck. ' References to this term can be classified into three groups. First are the references to the fact that the transition from low into middle income is a major leap in the quest to become high income, but without explicitly mentioning the term middle-income trap (e.g., Spence 2011, chapter 16) ; or explicit references to the term but with strong qualifiers, e.g., '…if such trap indeed exists' (World Bank 2010) . Second, are the believers in the idea of a middle-income trap (Gill and Kharas 2007; Ohno 2009 ; Kharas and Kohli 2011). They define it as a situation where economies are unable to compete with low-income, low-wage economies in manufactures and unable to compete with advanced economies in high-skilled innovation. Third, is the recent literature on growth slowdowns, which studies how rapidly growing economies can stagnate in the middle-income segment and fail to graduate to high income Shin 2011, 2013; Aiyar et al. 2013 ). Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2013) argue that growth in middle-income decelerates in stepsonce around $10,000-$11,000 (in 2005 PPP $) and then again around $15,000-$16,000. 1 Aiyar et al. (2013) show that middle-income economies are more likely to experience growth slowdowns than either low-income economies or high-income economies. Hence, they argue, the former economies are 'trapped. ' In this paper, we argue, first, that none of the papers referred to above has provided a definition of the middle-income trap, much less a theoretical treatment of the phenomenon. 2 The idea of being unable to compete (the second strand of literature referred to above) is almost a tautology since, under such a view, all middle-income economies are, by definition, trapped. We believe that some authors have tried to draw a parallel with a well-established concept in the development literature, namely Nelson's (1956) notion of 'low-level equilibrium trap.' The parallel, however, is rather unfortunate because of the lack of a theory that explains what the middle-income trap is. The third view does not provide a definition either. This group is concerned with growth slowdowns, which is not the same as being 'trapped.' A growth slowdown at best means a bump in the path to high-income status, but does not mean that an economy experiencing a growth slowdown will be unable to reach high income. It only implies that it might take it slightly longer. At best, this strand of the literature provides a characterization of the economies that have not reached high-income status, and identified some factors that may be behind the growth slowdown in the quest to high income.
Second, we propose to study transitions across income groups to see if there is evidence that economies do not advance, i.e., that they are stuck. This is fundamental for any sound discussion of the likelihood of the alleged phenomenon of the middle-income trap, as well as for policy debates. The criterion we propose (note that we avoid using the term middle-income trap) is based on a thorough analysis of the historical transitions of a large number of economies across income categories. Based on this historical experience, we determine the number of years that economies have typically spent in the middle-income segment. Together with the income thresholds for each income category, this allows us to calculate the growth rate (of per capita gross domestic product [GDP]) that economies would need to achieve to cross the middle-income segment in this typical (more precisely, the median) number of years. The logical consequence of our argument is that some economies traverse the middle-income segment faster than others simply because they (the former) grow faster. This helps bring the discussion back to the familiar turf of growth theory and its central question, namely, why some economies grow faster than others, a question that we do not tackle in this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we explain how we construct the data set that we use and show how we obtain the income per capita cut-offs in order to identify the lower-middle income and upper-middle-income segments in dollar PPPs of 1990. The income classification for 1-2013 AD provides valuable information about transitions across income groups. Using this income classification, Section 3 identifies the economies that have made the middle-income transitions before and after 1950 and proposes criteria to differentiate slow from fast transitions. Using these criteria, Section 4 identifies the economies that as of 2013 are experiencing slow transitions. The historical evidence that we have gathered and analyzed indicates that economies do move up across income groups; and that many economies that today are high income spent many decades traversing the middle-income segment. As a consequence, we reject the existence of a middle-income trap as a generalized phenomenon. What is true, obviously, is that some countries grow faster than others and hence make the transitions across income groups faster. This does not mean that the other economies are 'trapped.' Section 5 summarizes our arguments and main findings.
Data and middle-income thresholds
To understand how long an economy has to be in the middle-income category before its transition can be considered slow, one has to analyze the long-term experience of the economies that progressed all the way into the high-income category.
The commonly used income classifications of the World Bank report income categories from 1987 onward. 3, 4 This is too short a time series for this type of analysis, as many economies were already high income in 1987. Moreover, some other economies were uppermiddle income in 1987 and made it into the high-income group afterwards. Hence, we do not know the number of years they spent in the middle-income group. Therefore, determining how long an economy has to be in the middle-income group before it can be considered that its transition is slow requires time-series data longer than those provided by the World Bank.
The rest of this section discusses the data and methodology we use to come up with sufficiently long time series to classify economies into various income categories.
Data
As argued above, to be able to determine whether an economy's transition is slow or not, we need long time series data. Maddison's (2010) database, 5 which goes back to 1 AD (for selected economies), allows us to undertake this analysis. Maddison (2010) provides comparable GDP per capita data (in PPP terms) for 159 economies. However, we discarded 35 economies: (i) 7 economies that had populations below 1 million in 2012; (ii) the 22 economies that came out of the partitions of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia; and (iii) 5 economies whose GDP per capita is not reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) database. 6 We thus have complete time-series data for 124 economies from 1950 to 2008. Of these 124 economies, Maddison's data set also provides data for 72 economies before 1950, although for different years, in some cases going as far back as 1 AD For some economies, this database reports complete time series starting in 1820. Finally, we extended Maddison's data up to 2013 using growth rates of GDP per capita from the Total Economy Database (TED) of The Conference Board using Geary-Khamis 1990 PPP $ (the same as the one used by Maddison [2010] ). 7 We updated the data of those economies without information from the TED using GDP per capita growth in local currency at constant prices from the IMF World Economic Outlook database. 8,9
Methodology: identifying income cut-offs
The first step in our procedure is to classify economies according to their income per capita. The World Bank's income classification is the most widely used for this purpose. The World Bank classifies economies into low income, lower-middle income, upper-middle income, and high income, based on the economies' gross national income (GNI) per capita in current prices. The World Bank sets the original per capita income thresholds for the different income groups by looking at the relationship between measures of wellbeing, including poverty incidence and infant mortality, and GNI per capita. 10 By taking into consideration non-income aspects of welfare, each category of the World Bank's income classifications reflects a level of well-being (not just income) characteristic of a set of economies when the original thresholds were established. 11 The World Bank updates the original thresholds every year by adjusting them for international inflation, the average inflation of the eurozone, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). By adjusting for inflation, the thresholds remain constant over time in real terms. 12 There is no restriction on the number of economies that can be in each categoryi.e., economies can all be high income, middle income, or low income.
However, the World Bank's thresholds, measured in current $ GNI per capita, cannot be applied directly to Maddison's data, as the latter uses GDP per capita measured in constant 1990 PPP $. Therefore, we need to define our own income thresholds. This means that we need to establish thresholds in 1990 PPP $, but would like to devise an income classification that matches as much as possible that of the World Bank; that is, if economies A, B, C, and D are classified as high income according to the World Bank, we would like most (if not all) of them to be also high income in our classification using 1990 PPP $ values. By doing this, we maintain the underlying information (both income and nonincome measures of well-being) that is encapsulated in each of the income categories. We then proceed as follows:
First, define sets of GDP per capita (in 1990 PPP $) thresholds. Each set i is composed of three thresholds t 0,i , t 1,i , and t 2,i , where t 0,i <t 1,i <t 2,i . t 0 is the threshold that separates low from lower-middle income; t 1 is the threshold that separates lower-middle income from upper-middle income; and t 2 is the threshold that separates upper-middle income from high income. Each set of thresholds i is a combination of t 0 from $1500 to $4750; t 1 from $5000 to $8750; and t 2 from $9000 to $20,000; at $250 intervals. 13 This gives a total of 14 (intervals of $250 from $1500 to $4750) £ 16 (intervals of $250 from $5000 to $8750) £ 45 (intervals of $250 from $9000 to $20,000) D 10,080 sets of thresholds. For example, set 1 is (t 0 , 1 D $1500; t 1,1 D $5000; and t 2,1 D $9000); set 2 is (t 0,2 D $1750; t 1,2 D $5000; and t 2,2 D $9000); and set 10,080 is (t 0,10080 D $4750; t 1,10080 D $8750; and t 2,10080 D $20,000).
Second, using GDP per capita (in 1990 PPP $) for each set i, categorize an economy as low income if its GDP per capita in a particular year is less than t 0,i ; lower-middle income if its GDP per capita is at least t 0,i , but less than t 1,i ; upper-middle income if its GDP per capita is at least t 1,i , but less than t 2,i ; and high income if its GDP per capita is at least t 2,i . For each year, code low-income economies as 0; lower-middle-income economies as 1; upper-middle-income economies as 2; and high-income economies as 3.
Third, calculate the pairwise polychoric correlations of each of the resulting 10,080 classifications with the World Bank's income classificationalso coded as ordinal values 0 (low income), 1 (lower-middle income), 2 (upper-middle income, and 3 (high income)for 1990. The polychoric correlation is the maximum likelihood estimate of the correlation between the continuous and normally distributed variables underlying the ordinal categories (Olsson 1979; Kolenikov and Angeles 2009 ). 14 We estimate correlations for 1990 because Maddison's GDP per capita data, which is in 1990 PPP $, for 1990 would be in current prices and the World Bank's income classification which is also based on current price data with the mentioned difference being that the World Bank uses GNI per capita. There were two combinations for which the polychoric correlations for 990 were ties: t 0 D $2000; t 1 D $7250; and t 2 D $11,250; and t 0 D $2000; t 1 D $7250; and t 2 D $11,750. To break this tie, we pooled all data from 1987 to 2013 to determine which of the two tied thresholds had the highest correlations. The set of thresholds that yielded the highest correlation was t 0 D $2000; t 1 D $7250; and t 2 D $11,750. Therefore, the income classification that we use is as follows: an economy is low income if its GDP per capita in 1990 PPP $ is less than $2000; lower-middle income if its GDP per capita is at least $2000 but less than $7250; upper-middle income if its GDP per capita is at least $7250 but less than $11,750; and high income if its GDP per capita is $11,750 or higher. These thresholds are constant over time. 15 As we use a different measure of income from the World Bank and define our own income thresholds to classify economies, there is likely to be a difference in income classifications of economies that we obtain and that of the World Bank. 16 As indicated above, this paper examines transitions from one income category into the next one. However, these graduations are not necessarily 'smooth,' i.e., some economies go back and forth between income categories before stabilizing into one or another. To be able to identify how long economies have been in an income category these 'jumps' need to be smoothened out. Based on the above thresholds, the following typologies of patterns in income categories are considered as smooth, i.e., they do not show any jumps:
i. Straight line pattern:
Permanently low-income (L) economies Permanently lower-middle-income (LM) economies Permanently high-income (H) economies ii. Ladder type pattern:
1 step from L to LM 2 steps from L to LM to upper-middle income (UM) 3 steps from L to LM to UM to H Economies whose income group classification does not follow either a straight line or a ladder pattern, as described above, have 'jumps.' There are 42 economies with jumps in their income classification at different points in time. To facilitate the analysis, we make some adjustments to the income categories to ensure that we get one of the two types of smooth patterns described above. These adjustments are described in Appendix A. 17 A remark is in order here. As future data become available, economies may be reclassified from one income category into another one. In this paper, we decided not to adjust an economy's income category if it changed only recently. For example, Colombia, based on our data, became upper-middle income only in 2013 and is treated as such rather than considering 2013 as a jump even though future data may indicate that it is the latter.
Distribution of economies by income classes
Using these thresholds and adjustments, the distribution of the 124 economies by income class over time is shown in Figure 2 . In 1950, 80 economies were classified as low income; 35 economies were lower-middle income; 6 economies were upper-middle income; and only 3 economies -Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirateshad income per capita above the high-income threshold. Maddison's (2010) per capita income estimates for these 3 economies in 1950 (in 1990 PPPs) were $28,878; $30,387; and $15,798, respectively. 18 The US reached the high-income threshold in 1944, but its income per capita slipped to upper-middle income after the war in 1945 (as noted in Appendix A, the US is reported as an upper-middle-income economy in 1944 instead of a high-income economy) and it regained (i.e., after the adjustment) high-income status only in 1962. Together with the US, the other five upper-middle-income economies in 1950 were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Venezuela. Figure 2 indicates that the number of economies in the low-income group has decreased over time, from 80 in 1950 to 39 in 2010 and to 37 in 2013. 19 By decade, the 1950s witnessed the largest decline in the number of low-income economies, when 11 made it into the lower-middle-income group (Table 1 ). This was followed by another 10 economies during the 1960s, and 10 more economies during the 1970s. From 1980 to the early 2000s, however, very few low-income economies graduated. The number of lowincome economies was still 47 (38% of the total) in 2000, almost the same as in 1980 (49 economies, or 39% of the total). This number gradually fell during 2000-2013, when 10 economies (Cambodia, Ghana, Honduras, India, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Viet Nam) attained lower-middleincome status. In total, 43 out of the 80 low-income economies in 1950 had graduated from the low-income category by 2013. By region, 14 out of these 43 economies were in Asia, 9 in Latin America and Caribbean, 9 in the Middle East and North Africa, 5 in Europe, and 6 in Sub-Saharan Africa.
There are 35 economies that have been always low income since 1950, 30 of them in Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 in Asia, and 1 in Latin America and Caribbean (Iraq and Nicaragua moved out of low income sometime during 1950-2013 but fell back into this category and were low income again in 2013.). These are shown in Table 2 . The 2013 income per capita in PPP terms of most of these economies is comparable (or even lower) to that of Western Europe (and other economies for which data are available) in the eighteenth century or earlier.
In 1950, there were 41 economies classified as middle income -35 lower-middle income and 6 upper-middle income ( Table 1) . This number increased to 54 (45 lowermiddle income and 9 upper-middle income) in 1980. 20 The net number of middle-income economies (i.e., those retaining their income category plus those entering the middle-class category minus those leaving the middle-class category) has remained around 50-55 since 1960. Namibia, Peru, and South Africa, for example, have been lower-middle-income economies since 1950. Figure 2 also shows that there was a sharp increase in the number of high-income economies between the late 1960s and 1980, and between the late 1980s and 2013. The former period overlaps with what Maddison (1982) referred to as the 'Golden Age' , when productivity accelerated considerably. The number of economies that reached the high-income threshold increased to 10 in 1970, 21 in 1980, and 33 in 2013 (Table 1) . During this period, several non-European economies, particularly East Asian (the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei, China) and Latin American (Argentina and Chile), reached high-income status.
In the next section, we use the income thresholds derived here to examine historical transitions from one income category into the next one. In doing so, we separate 'slow' from 'fast' transitions. We argue that what distinguishes economies in their quest to reach high-income status is the speed of these transitions. But a slow transition does not mean that the country is 'trapped.' As the discussion above indicates, historically, economies do Year  L  LM  UM  H  1950  80  35  6  3  1960  69  40  11  4  1970  59  41  14  10  1980  49  45  9  21  1990  47  45  9  23  2000  47  39  11  27  2008  40  39  14  31  2010  39  39  15  31  2013  37  39 15 33
Source: Authors. advance. It is this distinction that matters most and helps bring the debate back to the familiar territory of growth theory, i.e., why do some economies grow faster than others? Based on the benchmarks that we develop in the next section to distinguish slow from fast transitions, we identify the economies that as of 2013 can be considered to have slow transitions from LM to UM, and those with slow transitions from UM to H. We also identify the economies that as of 2013 cannot be considered to have slow transitions.
Defining middle-income transitions
Our analysis of middle-income transitions is based on the historical experience of economies that reached high income and the time it took them to do so. Given the lack of a theory about how long it takes an economy to traverse from LM to UM, and from UM to H, we adopt a simple procedure. This consists in determining the threshold number of years that an economy has to be in one of the middle-income groups so that, beyond it, one can say that it is relatively slow to graduate. This number of years is determined by examining the historical experience of the economies that graduated from lower-middle income to upper-middle income, and from upper-middle income to high income. We take the median number of years that it took these economies to transition as our benchmark to separate fast from slow transitions. Consequently, we will say that an economy is slow in graduating from the lower-/upper-middle-income group today if it has been in that group longer than the benchmark, based on historical transitions. This method entails an unavoidable element of subjectivity, and therefore, one has to be careful in taking the threshold number of years literally. It is only a guide. We examine both the lower-middleincome and upper-middle-income transitions separately.
The transition from lower-middle income into upper-middle income
We first determine the number of years that economies remained in the lower-middleincome group before they graduated to upper-middle income. To do so, we separate data before and after 1950 because we have a complete time series for 124 economies starting in 1950. 21 From the list of 124 economies, a total of 45 economies have graduated from lower-middle income into upper-middle income. We divide them into two groups: (i) the 36 economies that became lower-middle income before or in 1950 and then graduated to upper-middle income ( Table 3) ; and (ii) the 9 economies that became lower-middle income after 1950 and then graduated to upper-middle income ( Table 4 ). This allows us to compare recent transitions with those that took place earlier. The tables give the year these economies attained lower-middle-income status; the year they attained uppermiddle-income status; the number of years they were lower-middle income; and their average income per capita growth rate during their transition from lower-middle income to upper-middle income. The time spent as lower-middle income for economies in Table 3 (economies that became lower-middle income before or in 1950) ranges from 19 years for Israel to 128 for the Netherlands. 22 The latter was the first economy to become lower-middle income (in 1827, over 100 years earlier than Japan) but spent 128 years, until 1955, in this category. Maddison (1982, p.4) pointed out that the acceleration of productivity growth happened during what he referred to as the 'capitalist era' that began in 1820. The Netherlands, For Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and Syrian Arab Republic, data for 1914-1949 is not available. All three economies were low income in 1913, the earliest year before 1950 for which data are available. For the latter three economies, we treat 1950 as the year they turned low-income. It is possible they turned low-income before 1950 but due to lack of data we are unable to determine the exact year. being the economic leader during the 1700s, was the richest economy during that time until the UK overtook it in the second half of the nineteenth century. Japan (a latecomer with respect to the advanced Western economies) spent 35 years as a lower-middle-income economy.
On the other hand, the time spent as lower-middle income for the nine economies that became lower-middle income after 1950 (Table 4 ) ranges from 17 years for the PRC to 50 years and above for Bulgaria, Costa Rica, and Turkey. This is significantly lower than the time spent as lower-middle income by most economies that had crossed the lowermiddle-income threshold in 1950 or before (Table 3) . Figure 3 uses the information in Tables 3 and 4 for the 45 economies that made the transition from lower-middle income into upper-middle income (see Table A1 for the Table A1 for the codes of each economy. Source: Authors. codes of each economy). It shows the regression line between the year an economy entered the lower-middle-income group and the number of years it spent in that group, before graduating into upper-middle income. Clearly, recent transitions have been significantly faster than those in the past. Figure 3 shows a statistically significant and negative relationship between the two variables with a slope of ¡0.6. Uruguay, Chile, or Hungary are well above the regression line. Hungary, for example, became a lower-middle-income economy in 1925, the same year as Venezuela. However, while it took the former 73 years to cross the lower-middle-income range, Venezuela did it in just 23.
The idea of a middle-income trap was conceived relatively recently by analyzing recent development experiences, not those of the nineteenth century or earlier ones. The median number of years that the economies in Table 3 spent as lower-middle income is 64 years, while the median of the economies in Table 4 is 28 years ( Table 5 ). The latter is clearly driven by the fast transition of the five East and Southeast Asian economies, significantly faster than those of the other economies in Table 3 . Only a few economies that made the transition before 1950 (Table 3 ) match the experience of these Asian economies (e.g., Israel, Portugal, and Venezuela). Table 5 shows that the median and mean of the time taken to traverse from LM to UM post-1950 is influenced by the experience of East and Southeast Asian economies; without the latter, the median increases to 52 years. Since the fast transitions seen post-1950 do not seem to be the norm, we combine all 45 economies that made the transition from lower-middle income into upper-middle income. The median number of years spent in the lower-middle-income group has been 55 years ( Table 5 ). We use this as a guide to separate slow from fast transitions. We will say that an economy is undergoing a slow transition in 2013 if it has spent over 55 years as a lower-middle-income economy, from the year it became an LM economy. With the guide of 55 years at hand, we can estimate the growth rate of per capita GDP that is necessary to transit from $2000 to $7250 in 55 years or less. This is 2.37% (or higher) per annum. Under this criterion, many of today's advanced economies went through slow transitions, although this did not prevent them from becoming high income.
The transition from upper-middle income into high income
In the second stage, we determine the number of years that economies remained in the upper-middle-income range before moving into high income. There are 30 economies that transitioned from upper-middle income into high income (recall that Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates were high income in 1950). These are again split into two groups: (i) the 5 economies that made the transition from upper-middle income into high income in 1950 or before ( Table 6 ); and (ii) the 25 economies that made the transition from upper-middle income into high income after 1950 ( Table 7) . Looking at the list of economies in Table 6 , the number of years spent as upper-middle income ranges from 14 years for Switzerland to 23 years for New Zealand. On the other hand, the time spent as upper-middle income for the economies in Table 7 ranges from a decade or less for the Asian economies to 41 years for Argentina. The difference between the maximum number of years spent as upper-middle-income economy before graduating to high income between these two groups is smaller than in the case of transition from lower-middle income to upper-middle income (compare with Table 3 and Table 4 ). Note that more than half of the economies in Table 7 are European, and five are Asian.
As above, we use the information on the 30 economies in Tables 6 and 7 , and regress the year an economy entered the upper-middle income and the number of years it spent in that group, before graduating into high income. Recent transitions have also been faster than those in the past. Figure 4 shows a statistically significant and negative relationship between the two variables with a slope of ¡0.11. Argentina and Greece appear to be well above the regression line, indicating that they spent many more years in the upper-middle income segment than other countries that also became high income; and also many more years than expected given when they turned upper-middle income (the predicted line indicates that they should have spent less than 20 years, about the same as Israel, Spain, Portugal or Ireland). Table 8 provides the summary information to separate fast transitions from UM to H from the slow ones. The median of all 30 economies is 15 years. Therefore, we will say that an economy is undergoing a slow transition as of 2013 if it has spent over 15 years as an upper-middle-income economy, from the time it became a UM economy. With this at hand, we can estimate the growth rate of per capita GDP that is necessary to avoid a slow transition from UM to H, that is, to transit from $7250 to $11,750 in 15 years or less. This Table A1 for the codes of each economy. Source: Authors. is, at least, 3.27% per annum. In this case, and as noted above, only Greece and especially Argentina spent a very long time as upper-middle-income economies.
Middle-income transitions today
The definitions in Section 3 of slow/fast transitions from LM to UM and from UM to H allow us to identify the economies that in 2013 were in what we refer to as slow or fast transitions. Based on our income classification, there were 54 middle-income economies in 2013, 39 lower-middle income and 15 upper-middle income. 23 Table 9 shows the 10 economies that as of 2013 were making the transition from LM to UM relatively slowly, compared to the historical benchmark of 55 years identified above. This means that they have been in this income segment for over 55 years; or, stated in terms of GDP per capita growth rate, they grew below 2.37% per annum since the year they became lower-middle income. All 10 economies belong to Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Guatemala has been a lower-middleincome economy the longest, 78 years. The table also provides, just for reference, an estimate of the time it will take them to become upper-middle-income economies by assuming they continue growing at the same rate as during 2003-2013. Table 10 shows the four economies that as of 2013 were experiencing slow transitions from UM to H based on the historical benchmark identified above. Venezuela has been the longest, 66 years (however, its transition of the lower-middle-income segment was very fast, 23 years). The table also provides the estimated growth rate to become high income under the assumption that GDP per capita growth is the same as during 2003-2013. 24 Tables 11 and 12 show the 29 lower-middle-income and the 11 upper-middle-income economies that, as of 2013, were not having slow transitions and may be able to make it to the next income category in fewer years than the historical benchmark identified for transition from LM to UM (55 years) and from UM to H (15 years). Given the number of years they have been lower-middle-income economies and their recent growth performance, we can speculate about the economies that are at risk of making a slow transition from LM to UM. Table 11 shows that there are economies whose growth rates during 2003-2013 (shown in previous to last column) were below those required to reach $7250 (shown in last column) within the number of years remaining before falling into a slow transition (shown in third column from last), e.g., Libya, Romania, Algeria, El Salvador, or Swaziland. If these economies want to transition into upper-middle income within the historical median of 55 years, they should implement policies to accelerate growth. Table 12 shows the average growth rate needed to avoid a slow transition from UM to H, assuming the average growth seen during 2003-2013 prevails. It indicates that economies, such as Costa Rica, Hungary, Mexico, Oman, and Turkey, may experience a slow transition. Thailand and Bulgaria may avoid the slow transition and the rest are likely to make it from UM to H in accordance to historical experience.
Finally, Table 13 shows the number of years corresponding to the complete transition time for the 30 economies that made it from lower-middle income into upper-middle income, and from the latter into high income, since 1950. The table indicates that it takes 8 decades. 25 We stress that the transitions of the East and Southeast Asian economies, about 3 decades, much shorter than the average, cannot be taken to be the norm. other extreme, there are eight economies that made the full transition but it took them over 55 years to go from LM to UM, and over 15 years to go from UM to H: Spain, the UK, Argentina, Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the US. Some of them spent over 100 years in the middle-income segment. Uruguay holds the recordlongest time: 142 years in total.
Conclusions: What are we to make of the term middle-income trap?
The widely discussed phenomenon of the middle-income trap is problematic because it has not been defined and because it has not been studied theoretically. It is also problematic because the idea of a trap implies that economies are stuck, which is not what we find. All this makes discussions of this concept challenging, to say the least, and somewhat unsubstantiated for policy analysis.
The idea of a middle-income trap has become popular as a way to compare the performance of a small group of East Asian economies with the Latin American economies. The evidence shows that during the last decades, the former grew faster and, consequently, transitioned across income groups also faster. The historical evidence presented in this paper, however, indicates that economies move up across income groups. While it is true that the East Asian economies moved up very fast in recent decades, their unique experience cannot be taken as a benchmark to separate slow from fast transitions, and to argue that economies that do not grow as fast are stuck in the middle-income trap. Indeed, analyzing a large sample of economies over many decades shows that experiences are wide, including that of many economies that today are high income but that spent many decades traversing the middle-income segment.
For these reasons, in this paper we have chosen to focus on slow versus relatively fast middle-income transitions. To do so, we first constructed income thresholds to classify 124 economies into various income categories. Then we examined the actual time taken by these economies to traverse from LM ($2000 in 1990 PPP $) to UM ($7250 in 1990 PPP $) and from UM to H ($11,750 in 1990 PPP $), since 1950. We find that, historically, the median number of years to traverse the lower-middle-income segment has been 55, and the median number of years to traverse the upper-middle-income segment has been 15. 26 These thresholds indicate that as of 2013, only a handful of economies could be said to be undergoing slow transitions. As a consequence, we reject the existence of a middleincome trap as a generalized phenomenon. These two thresholds also allow us to calculate the minimum GDP per capita growth rate that economies need to achieve in order to traverse each income segment within the benchmark time: 2.37% per annum for lower-middle income, and 3.27% per annum for upper-middle income. This latter point makes it clear that the problem of fast versus slow transitions is simply a question of growth. Surely different countries make the income transitions at different speeds and there are reasons that explain this, e.g., that some countries achieve a certain threshold industrialization in employment (Felipe, Mehta and Rhee 2014). 27 Stated in these terms, these question(s) can be framed in the familiar terms of standard growth discussions, i.e., why do some economies grow faster than others?; and use standard growth theory to discuss why some economies have slow transitions, without the need to appeal to a poorly-defined concept. Notes 1. In an earlier version of the paper, Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2013) report the existence of only a single node around $15,000-$16,000 at which slowdowns occur. 2. In this paper, we update and extend the results presented in a previous working paper by Felipe, Abdon and Kumar (2012) . Specifically, we (i) extend the data coverage until 2013, (ii) revise the income classification of economies to smooth out the fluctuations in the income categories, and (iii) revise the criteria used in the earlier paper to determine whether an economy is 'trapped' or not. 3. http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK: 20487070»menuPK:64133156»pagePK:64133150»piPK:64133175»theSitePK:239419,00. html 4. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls 5. http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm 6. These economies are as follows: (i) populations below 1 million people in 2012: Bahrain, Comoros, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles. Bahrain's population is more than 1 million today but was excluded as its population has exceeded 1 million since 2007 only. Pacific islands are not included in the Maddison data. Also, all these islands, except Papua New Guinea, have very small populations; (ii) economies of the former Soviet Union (15) , the former Yugoslavia (5), and the former Czechoslovakia (2), for which data is not complete for 1950-2008; and (iii) Cuba, Democratic Republic of Korea, Puerto Rico, Somalia, and West Bank and Gaza whose GDP per capita estimates are not reported by the IMF database. In addition, we continue to leave out Trinidad and Tobago which was dropped from the data used for the previous version of this paper. 7. ttps://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filenameDflatall21.txt&typeDsubsite 8. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx 9. For the 124 economies with consistent data since 1950, we calculated annual growth rates. This resulted in 7,812 (124 Ã 63) annual growth rates. Of these 7,812 growth rates, 75 were higher than 20% (positive or negative). Most of these 75 observations are either resource-rich economies or economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The other cases are Afghanistan, Albania, and Bulgaria. Three observations that stand out are the Republic of Korea's growth rate in 1953, and Cambodia's growth rates in 1973 and 2004. We take the Maddison data as it is for all these observations, except for Cambodia in 2004. The growth rate for Cambodia, based on the original Maddison date, in 2004 is estimated at 41.1%, which seemed implausible. For Cambodia, from 1990 to 2010, we use data from the revision of Maddison's data set under the "New Maddison Project Database" available at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data. htm. We do not update any other historical data, i.e., use the original Maddison data set. 10. 'The process of setting per capita income thresholds started with finding a stable relationship between a summary measure of wellbeing such as poverty incidence and infant mortality on the one hand and economic variables including per capita GNI estimated based on the Bank's Atlas method on the other. Based on such a relationship and the annual availability of Bank's resources, the original per capita income thresholds were established.' Source: World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:
25. The reported median in Table 13 is not the sum of the median of the transitions from LM into UM, and then from UM into H, shown earlier in Tables 5 and 8 . Rather, this is the median number of years that it took the 30 economies in our data set that transitioned from LM into H. 26. It is important to note that our criteria will have to be revised as more countries transit the middle-income segment. 27. Felipe et al. (2014) find that all of today's rich nonoil economies enjoyed at least 18% manufacturing employment shares in the past, and often did so before becoming rich. High manufacturing output shares are not as important. 
